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PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL CASES
THE basic purpose of a trial is to ascertain facts. In early times God was
assigned the role of fact-finder, and trials consisted of physical ordeals or indi-
vidual combats to invoke His judgment.' Today, however, disputes are decided
by mortals whose verdicts depend on evidence presented by contesting parties.
Therefore the objectives of modern trial procedure should be to promote the
fullest possible presentation of the facts, minimize opportunities for falsification
of evidence, and eliminate the vestiges of trial by combat.
One procedural device which helps to achieve these objectives is compulsory
disclosure 2 of evidence by both sides before trial. By giving each party a chance
to dig up new facts which may rebut or explain his opponent's evidence, dis-
closure reduces the importance of surprise and guesswork.3 Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules, pre-trial disclosure has become
a matter of right, utilized with much success. 4 In the criminal law, however,
its utility has received far less acknowledgment. 5 Trial by judicial battle, in
which concealment is one of the major weapons, remains the modus operandi
of the criminal fact-finding process. 6
PREVAILING LAW
To a limited degree, four kinds of disclosure are available in criminal trials.
Defendants have some rights to discovery of tangible evidence, inspection of
1. Robertson, Trial by Ordeal, 38 JuRID. REv. 70 (1926). See also Ploscowe, The
Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and America, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 433, 437-41 (1935).
2. The words "disclosure" and "discovery" are used synonymously throughout this
Comment to mean disclosure of tangible evidence, testimony, names of witnesses, etc.,
before trial.
3. Sunderland, foreword to RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL iii (1932).
4. See Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 41 MIcH. L. REV. 205 (1942); Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-
Discovery Procedure, 38 COL. L. REV. 1179, 1436 (1938). On civil discovery prior to
the Federal Rules, see RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932).
5. This is particularly true of the United States. In England, however, disclosure
is an accepted part of criminal procedure. No accused person can be brought to trial
without a preliminary hearing at which all of the witnesses give their testimony. The
accused is present and may question the witnesses. Depositions are made from each wit-
ness' testimony and preserved for trial. The procedure is enforced strictly; irregularities
are grounds for quashing a subsequent conviction. See Indictable Offenses Act, 1848, 11
& 12 Vicr., c. 42, §§ 17, 27; Rex v. Gee, 25 Cr. App. R. 198 (1936) ; Rex v. Phillips and
Quayle, 26 Crim. App. R. 200 (1938); AcmCIBOLD'S PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE
IN CRIMINAL CASES 412-25 (31st ed. 1943).
6. See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 321-3 (1947). For
a criticism of the so-called "sporting theory of justice," see POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 163-4 (1930); Perkins, Absurdities in Criminal Procedure, 11 IowA L.
REV. 297, 322-35 (1926).
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grand jury minutes, and lists of the government's witnesses. And prosecutors
in a few states can obtain notice of certain defenses.
Discovery of Tangible Evidence by Defendants
Under the common law, defendants are seldom permitted to inspect items of
prosecution evidence. Originally, criminal courts were powerless to order dis-
covery ;7 pre-trial disclosure, it was felt, would subvert criminal justice. Today,
however, the power to require production of tangible evidence is generally
assumed to exist in the discretion of the trial court.8 But in exercising their
discretion, most courts have denied discovery on the broad ground that defend-
ants should not be allowed to pry into the prosecution's case.9 Occasionally,
however, courts have permitted inspection of admissible 10 weapons," finger-
prints,' 2 memoranda," or written confessions,' 4 often for unstated reasons, and
7. State v. Jeffries, 117 Kan. 742, 232 Pac. 873 (1925) ; Rex v. Holland, 4 T.I 691,
100 Eng. Reprints 1248 (1792). The Holland case, which is usually cited as the leading
authority for denying power to order discovery, had ceased to be the law of England long
before any comparable American cases were decided. See Regina v. Colucci, 3 F. & F.
104, 176 Eng. Reprints 46 (1861) ; Rex v. Harrie, 6 Car. & P. 105, 172 Eng. Reprints
1165 (1833).
People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927), held the
trial court powerless to require the prosecutor to disclose notes and memoranda which
were inadmissible in evidence. The question whether admissible papers might be ordered
disclosed was left unsettled. Accord, State ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W.
2d 459 (1930).
For general discussions of discovery of tangible evidence, see People v. Gatti, 167
Misc. 545, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938); Notes, 52 ALR 207 (1928); 39
CoL. L. REv. 287 (1939); 53 Dict. L. REv. 301 (1949); 41 HAav. L. Rv. 519 (1928);
38 3. Cnmr. L. & ClrIiINoLoY 249 (1947); 20 TuLAXN L. REv. 133 (1945) (inspection
of written confessions).
8. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 265, 93 N.E. 809, 811 (1911);
State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348, 357, 195 A. 497, 501 (1937).
9. E.g., State v. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 S.W. 1113 (1895) (defendant not per-
mitted to see his own written statement); People v. Skoyec, 183 Misc. 764, 50 N.Y.S.
2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (inspection of confession denied) ; Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173
Va. 458, 2 S.E. 2d 293 (1939) (defendant had no right to inspect his notes and diary
before trial, although they were later introduced in evidence against him).
10. Where the material sought is inadmissible in evidence the defense has almost
no chance of seeing it. See Cramer v. State, 145 Nebr. 88, 95, 15 N.W. 2d 323, 327
(1944); State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S. Dak. 115, 119, 244 N.W. 100, 101
(1932).
11. Application of Hughes, 181 Misc. 668, 673, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 843, 847 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
(gun and bullets).
12. United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (1922) (piece of glass with fingerprints
on it); People v. Terzani, 149 Misc. 818, 269 N.Y. Supp. 620 (County Ct. 1933)
(fingerprints on gun).
13. State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S. Dak. 115, 244 N.W. 100 (1932)
(defendant, indicted for defrauding county by overcharging for construction of bridge,
allowed to inspect field notes of county engineer).
14. State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 69, 51 A. 2d 647, 849 (1947) ; People v. Rogas, 158
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sometimes because the object sought formed the basic evidence of the prosecu-
tion's charge.15 In a few jurisdictions discovery, where needed to help prepare
a defense, has been declared a matter of right. Thus trial court refusals to allow
an indicted city treasurer to inspect his seized books,' 6 an alleged murderer to
copy his purported confession,17 and a man accused of possessing intoxicating
liquor to analyze the contents of bottles found in his home 18 have been reversed
on appeal.
Statutes in three jurisdictions allow the accused to move for discovery of
certain state evidence. In Florida defendants, upon a showing of good cause,
are permitted to participate in state-conducted examinations of ballistics, finger-
prints, or stains made by blood, semen, etc.; or to inspect and copy documents,
letters, or photographs held by the prosecution. 19 Inspection of written con-
fessions, however, has been held beyond the scope of the statute.
20
The 1946 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and similar rules in Mary-
land also permit discovery of evidence. Under Federal Rule 16 defendants
may request disclosure of material "obtained from or belonging to the
defendant or obtained from others by seizure or process."2' 1 But the reach
of Rule 16 is limited. Defendants have been denied inspection of their own
written confessions and statements, 22 statements of accomplices, 23 and other
important documentary evidence. 24  A recently promulgated Maryland rule
Misc. 567, 287 N.Y. Supp. 1005 (County Ct. 1936) (defendant's psychiatrists allowed to
see his confession to help in determining his sanity).
15. United States v. Warren, 53 F. Supp. 435 (D. Conn. 1944) (defendant, charged
with mailing package containing threatening letter, allowed to inspect package) ; People
v. Radeloff, 140 Misc. 690, 252 N.Y. Supp. 290 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1931) (attorney, charged
with extortion, permitted to obtain photostatic copies of letter and retainer agreement
with client, on which charge was based).
16. People v. Gerold, 265 Il. 448, 470, 107 N.E. 165, 174 (1914).
17. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 958, 22 So. 2d 273, 283, (1945).
18. State v. Naething, 318 Mo. 531, 540, 300 S.W. 829, 831 (1927).
19. FLA. STAT. AxN. § 909.18 (1943).
20. Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
21. FED. R. Cam. P. 16: "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of
the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, docu-
ments or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from
others by seizure or process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the
time, place and manner of making the inspection and of taking the copies or photographs
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just."
22. Shores v. United States, 174 F. 2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (D. Mass. 1947); United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D.
Ind. 1946).
23. United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696 (W. D. La. 1949).
24. United States v. Rosenberg, 10 F.R.D. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (defendants in
espionage trial not allowed to see sketches of atomic experiment alleged to have been
turned over to foreign agents).
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promises to cover more ground than Rule 16. This rule, patterned after
Rule 16, contains an additional phrase-"written statements by the defendant"
-which presumably includes confessions and incriminating letters.2 5
Federal .Rule 17(c) gives defendants greater opportunities for disclosure.
This rule provides for subpoenas of documents and objects in a party's
possession which either side intends to introduce at the trial.2 6 Unlike most
subpoenas, a 17(c) subpoena may be returnable before trial if the court so
directs.2 7  This feature, in effect, turns Rule 17(c) into a discovery provision.
And in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States the Supreme Court allowed a
pre-trial subpoena of evidence which the defendant could not have discovered
under Rule 16--evidence obtained by the government without the use of
seizure or process.2 8 This decision might well enable defendants to obtain
disclosure of written confessions under 17(c). A more important conse-
quence of the Bowman case is that defendants in federal courts will have,
subject to the court's discretion, access before trial to the government's evi-
dence. For Bowman specifically held that the trial court, if it wants to,
may order a pre-trial subpoena of all documents and papers presented to the
grand jury or to be offered in evidence at the trial.29
Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes
Advance notice of opposing witnesses' testimony is probably worth more to
litigants than discovery of tangible evidence. In criminal trials, however, it is
Prior to the adoption of the Criminal Rules most federal courts opposed disclosure
in criminal trials. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F. 2d 74 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied sub norn. Nachman v. United States, 286 U. S. 556 (1932). A major
departure from this policy seemed likely when tentative drafts of the Criminal Rules
proposed a broad right to move for discovery of documents, papers or objects "obtained
from or belonging to the defendant, or constituting evidence" if the material sought was
reasonably necessary for preparing a defense. See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT 94 (1944). In the final draft, however, the discovery
rule was changed to its present form.
25. See Rule 5, Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted Dec. 6, 1949 by
the Maryland Court of Appeals. 71 A. 2d ,xviii (advance sheet).
26. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 4229 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1951).
27. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 YALE L.J. 197,
221 (1947).
28. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, supra note 26, reversing United States v.
Bowman Dairy Co., 185 F. 2d 159 (7th Cir. 1950).
29. The subpoena in the Bowman case included documents and papers (a) presented
to the grand jury, or (b) to be offered in evidence at the trial, or (c) relevant to the
charges in the indictment. Documents under (c) were demanded "whether or not they
might constitute evidence." The Supreme Court upheld the order as to (a) and (b)
but struck it down as to (c) on the ground that (c) was "a catch-all provision, not
intended to produce evidentiary materials but merely a fishing expedition to see what
may turn up." 19 U.S.L. WEEK 4231 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1951).
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generally available, if at all, only through inspection of grand jury minutes.30
And such inspection affords at best only partial disclosure, since the prosecution
need not present its entire case to the grand jury.3'
At least two state statutes give the accused the right to inspect grand jury
minutes. 32 Absent such a statute, a defendant can generally inspect the minutes
only to show violation of his constitutional rights, misconduct by the grand jury,
or insufficiency of the evidence on which the indictment was based. 3 New York
courts, for example, often allow inspection where insufficiency of evidence is
alleged,34 while denying it where the defendant appears merely to be seeking
information to help prepare his defense.35 In the federal courts, however, de-
fendants have generally been denied inspection under any circumstances. 36
30. Transcripts of testimony at other preliminary inquests are a potential source
of the opponent's evidence. But requests lor such transcripts are often denied. McAden
v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 21 So. 2d 33 (1945); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 813,
120 S. W. 2d 649 (1938).
31. The prosecutor need present only enough evidence to satisfy statutory require-
ments for the bringing of indictments. For a typical statute, see MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 628.03 (1946) : "The grand jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence taken
together is such as, in its judgement, would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant
a conviction by a trial jury."
32. IOWA CODE ANN. § 772.4 (1949); Ky. CRIm. CODE § 110 (Carroll 1948). Most
states, however have statutes requiring secrecy of grand jury proceedings. E.g., N. Y.
CODE RIM. PROC. §§ 265, 952-t (1945). See, generally, Note, 37 COL. L. REv. 315 (1937).
33. For general discussions, see People v. Steinhardt, 47 Misc. 252, 93 N. Y. Supp.
1026 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Kidd, Secrecy vs. Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes, 6 PANEL
no. 1 p. 4 (1928). It is sometimes said, however, that defendants have no right what-
ever to inspect grand jury minutes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205,
211, 80 N.E. 2d 825, 830 (1948).
34. People v. Moskowitz, 119 Misc. 837, 196 N. Y. Supp. 634 (County Ct. 1922);
People v. Wood, 93 Misc. 701, 157 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1916); People v.
Klaw, 53 Misc. 158, 104 N. Y. Supp. 482 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1907).
35. E.g., People v. Browne, 184 Misc. 764, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 759, (County Ct. 1945);
People v. Keppler, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1941). But cf. People v. Kresel, 142
Misc. 88, 254 N. Y. Supp. 193 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (Kresel had testified at a grand
jury investigation which resulted in the indictment of another man. At the trial,
Kresel allegedly contradicted his previous testimony; he was thereupon indicted for
perjury. The court before which Kresel was to be tried held that he was entitled to
inspect the very lengthy testimony he gave at the original grand jury hearing for the
explicit purpose of preparing his defense).
36. E.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (per L.
Hand, J.: "[Inspection] is said to lie in discretion, and perhaps it does, but no judge
of this court has granted it, and I hope none ever will.") ; United States v. Morse, 292
Fed. 273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (per A.N. Hand, J.: "[flt has, I think, generally been
regarded in this district as impossible for a defendant to obtain an order for examina-
tion of the minutes, as may be done in the New York State courts") ; United States v.
National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n., 61 F. Supp. 590 (D.N.J. 1945). But see United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-4 (1940) : "Grand jury testimony
is ordinaiily confidential ... But after the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure
is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it."
[Vol. 60 : 626
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Names of Prosecution Witnesses
An important object of disclosure is to enable each side to know the names
of opposition witnesses.3 7 Although the common law afforded no such right,3
in most states defendants are now entitled, by case law or by statute, to a pre-
trial list of the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses.39 Usually the list
need include only witnesses who testified before the grand jury.40 More rarely,
the requirement covers all witnesses known to the prosecutor or all he intends
to produce at the trial.4 ' An old federal statute gives defendants in capital cases
the right to a list of witnesses to be produced at trial.42 But in line with their
general policy against disclosure, the federal courts have refused to extend this
right to other categories of defendants. 43
Even a list requirement covering all witnesses which the prosecution intends
to produce at trial does not necessarily prevent the production of new witnesses.
Generally the prosecutor can produce unlisted witnesses if he did not know of
them when he submitted his list to the defendant. 44 In addition, witnesses can
usually be called in rebuttal without prior notice.
45
37. For judicial opinions to this effect, see State ex re. Porter v. District Court,
220 P. 2d 1035, 1042 (Mont. 1950) ; Leahy v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 570, 585-9, 13 S.W.
2d 874, 881-2 (1928).
38. State v. Daspit, 129 La. 752, 56 So. 661 (1911); Cornell v. State, 104 Wis. 527,
539, 80 N.W. 745, 749 (1899).
39. The rules of all American jurisdictions are set forth and analyzed in 6 WIGMORE,
EviDENCE §§ 1850-5 (3d ed. 1940).
In Washington the witness list statute, which applies only to prosecutions by in-
formation, also requires the defendant to give the prosecuting attorney a list of defense
witnesses to be called at the trial. The defendant must file his list five days after
receiving the prosecutor's list. WASH. REv. STAT. § 2050 (Remington 1932).
40. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 384 (1938); S. DAM CODE § 34.1233 (1939).
41. E.g., Amiz. CODE ANN. §44-759 (1939) (the statute provides, however, that
"[n]o continuance shall be allowed because of failure to endorse any of said names") ;
CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 48 § 455 (1935); IoWA CODE ANN. § 769.4 (1949). The Colorado
and Iowa statutes apply only to prosecutions by information. In the latter state the
defendant is also entitled to a minute of the testimony of each witness on the list.
42. 18 U.S.C. §3432 (1946).
43. Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F. 2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Jones v. United States, 162
Fed. 417 (9th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 576 (1908); United States v. Oley, 21
F. Supp. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937). The federal rule, under such a construction, is some-
what inconsistent. If disclosure of witnesses is permissible in civil cases but not in
criminal cases because the fear of prison makes defendants likely to tamper with
witnesses, then tampering should be most likely in those cases involving the death
penalty.
For a strict interpretation of a state witness statute, see State ex rel. Porter v.
District Court, 220 P. 2d 1035, 1041-3 (Mont. 1950).
44. People v. Weisberg, 396 Ill. 412, 71 N.E. 2d 671, cert. denied. 331 U.S. 826
(1947) ; State v. Cook, 30 Kan. 82, 1 Pac. 32 (1883). Some courts allow the prosecu-
tor to call unlisted witnesses at the trial even if he did know of them at the time he
submitted his list to the defendant. State v. McDonald, 51 Mont. 1, 149 Pac. 279 (1915)
(although prosecutor violated statutory command by neglecting, deliberately or through
ignorance, to endorse some witnesses, defendant was denied a new trial).
45. E.g., Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 392, 36 P. 2d 764 (1934).
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Pleading Affirmative Defenses
A form of disclosure especially important to prosecutors is advance notice
of the theory of the defendant's case, While the state must reveal in the indict-
ment or information the nature of its charge against an accused, under the
common law the defendant need give no notice of his defense in his plea of "not
guilty." Ordinarily such defenses as entrapment, alibi, self-defense and insanity
may be offered at the trial without prior warning.
46
A number of states have changed the common law rule by enacting statutes
requiring defendants to plead specially defenses of alibi or insanity.47 If the
defense is not pleaded the court may exclude evidence tendihg to prove it.
43
The statutes have been construed, however, to permit the defendant to establish
any defense at any time by his own testimony.49 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure contain no provision for disclosure of defenses. An alibi rule was
proposed in the tentative drafts, but was not promulgated by the Supreme
Court.t0
46. See, e.g., Romero v. Squier, 133 F. 2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1943) (entrapment);
Shields v. State, 221 Ala. 321, 128 So. 786 (1930) (self-defense); Leonard v. State, 17
Ariz. 293, 299, 151 Pac. 947, 949 (1915) (alibi); James v. State, 110 Ark. 170, 171,
160 S.W. 1090 (1913) (statute of limitations); People v. Joyce, 233 N.Y. 61, 70, 134
N.E. 836, 840 (1922) (insanity).
47. On special pleas of affirmative defenses in criminal cases, see, generally, Com-
ment, 38 YA=E L.J. 650 (1929).
On alibi statutes, see FEDERAL RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY
DRAFT 81-9 (1944); Millar, The Statutory Notice of Alibi, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 849 (1934); Notes, 10 FORD. L. REv. 305 (1941); J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 629 (1940) ; 21 VA. L. REv. 940 (1935).
On insanity statutes, see State v. Wallace, 170 Oreg. 60, 91-105, 131 P. 2d 222, 234-40
(1942).
In Scotland, a statute has long required the pleading of all affirmative defenses. 50
& 51 Vior. c. 35, § 36 (1887). In England the effectiveness of surprise alibi defenses has
been limited by the courts' practice of making unfavorable comments to the jury on the
defendants' failure to reveal his defense earlier. See The Defense of Alibi, 179 L. T. 212
(1935) ; Note, 26 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 454 (1935).
48. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1631 (Burns 1933) (if defendant desires to make an
alibi defense, he must give notice; he can then demand that the prosecutor inform him
of the exact time and place of the alleged offense) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1946)
(upon application of prosecutor, defendant must file notice of alibi, stating where he was
at the time of the crime; if he fails to file the notice, evidence of alibi may be excluded) ;
VAsH. REv. STAT. § 2174 (Remington 1932) (if defendant desires to plead insanity, he
must so state when he pleads to the indictment) ; WIs. STAT. § 355.07 (1949) (same as
Minnesota, except that defendant must give notice without being asked for it).
49. People v. Rakiec, 289 N.Y. 306, 45 N.E. 2d 812 (1942) ; Note, 15 ST. JoHIN's L.
REv. 304 (1941).
Alibi statutes are apparently invulnerable to constitutional objections. People v.
Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (County Ct., Queens County 1936); See State
v. Thayer, 124 Ohio 1, 4, 176 N.E. 656, 657 (1931).
50. FEDERAL RULEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRArr 80 (1944).
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TEiE CASE FOR AND AGAINST DISCLOSURE
Objections to Disclosure
Perjury and Tampering with Witnesses. The major argument against
criminal discovery is that instead of aiding it would deter accurate fact-finding.
Advance disclosure, it is said, gives defendants the opportunity to falsify and
suppress evidence. The criminal, if he knows the case against him, will procure
perjured testimony to establish a false defense.51 In addition, the argument con-
tinues, the accused, if informed of adverse witnesses' testimony, may cajole,
bribe, or frighten them into changing their stories or having "memory lapses."
' 2
And such misuse of discovery is more likely in criminal than in civil cases, be-
cause litigants have a much higher stake in the outcome.5
3
A similar objection is made to forcing defendants to reveal the names of their
witnesses. According to one writer, intimidation by prosecutors is so effective
that the result of such disclosure "will be that the defendant, guilty or innocent,
will have no witnesses at the trial, unless it happens that he was visiting the
archbishop on the night of the crime.
'0 4
While subornation of perjury and tampering with witnesses are a real prob-
lem, they can occur almost as easily without a change in the prevailing law of
disclosure. The guilty defendant, necessarily acquainted with the details of the
crime which the state must prove, can fabricate a defense accordingly.5 In
addition, in most jurisdictions he is already furnished with a list of prosecution
witnesses,56 whom he can tamper with as he pleases. Only the innocent have no
51. See State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 423-4, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910); Com-
monwealth v. Mead, 12 Gray 167, 170 (Mass. 1858) ("The reasons on which the sanc-
tion of secrecy which the common law gives to proceedings before grand juries is
founded are said in the books to be threefold ... A second is that perjury and subornation
of perjury may be prevented by withholding the knowledge of facts testified to before the
grand jury, which if known, it would be for the interest of the accused or their confed-
erates to attempt to disprove by procuring false testimony.").
According to experts, perjury is already "omnipresent" in our courts. Boston, Drastic
Change In Law Necessary To Curb Perjury In Our Courts, 13 PANEL no. 1, p. 6 (1935) ;
Hopkins, The Lawyer's Duty Toward A Guilty Client, 9 PANEL 48 (1931). See also Green-
berg, Perjury is YOUR Concern, 24 PANEL 3 (1950); Hibschman, "You Do Solemnly
Swear!" Or That Perjury Problem, 24 J. Clum. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 901 (1934).
52. See Smith, Grand Jury Witnesses, 6 PANEL no. 9, p. 8 (1928) ; Note, 21 WEST
VA. L. Q. 301 (1935) ; Elpern, Disintegration of Justice by Tampering with Witnesses and
Testimony, 6 PANEL no. 9, p. 3 (1928).
53. A further argument against disclosure is that it might keep witnesses from
coming forward with information during investigations of crime. See Commonwealth
v. Mead, 12 Gray 167, 170 (Mass. 1858) ; People v. Di Carlo, 161 Misc. 484, 485-6, 292
N.Y. Supp. 252, 254 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
54. Stewart, Comments on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 JoHN MARSHALL
L.Q. 296, 300 (1943).
55. Seemingly, the only way to keep a guilty defendant from preparing a false de-
fense is to conceal from him the fact that he is charged with crime.
56. See note 39 supra. For the same reason, the danger that witnesses would be
afraid to give information, note 53 supra, is almost as great under present law.
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inkling of what facts the government must prove or what the listed witnesses
will probably say; they are the real beneficiaries of disclosure.
Moreover, the dangers to accurate fact-finding apply mainly to testimony of
witnesses, not to inspection of tangible evidence. It is not easy to tamper with
documents or inanimate objects, or to refute them by perjury. And even where
witnesses are involved, the fear of perjury is perhaps overstated. Perjury is an
ancient bugaboo, trotted out periodically to block procedural reform. Interested
parties were once disqualified from testifying, largely because everyone thought
they would lie. Disqualification ended when the potential evils of perjury were
finally felt to be outweighed by the manifest injustice of excluding essential
evidence.57 Denial of disclosure to forestall false defenses is perhaps equally
unwise.
Prosecution at a Disadvantage. A further objection to disclosure begins with
the premise that criminal procedure is overweighted in favor of the accused, and
concludes that it would be unjust to the public to give defendants the additional
help of discovery. 8 In civil litigation, the argument runs, parties are on an
equal footing, but in criminal trials such rules as the presumption of innocence
give the accused all the advantages. And as one court put it, "[i] n these days
criminals are both skilled and cunning, and it is a contest between the people and
the criminals for the mastery." 9 Moreover, while both sides must disclose
their evidence in civil trials, it is said that this element of reciprocity is lacking
in criminal cases because of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination.60
57. See 2 WIGMOIE, EVIDENCE §§ 575-7 (3d ed. 1940).
58. See L. I-land J. in United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923):
"Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution
is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is
immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there
is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should
in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his
defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see .... Our dangers do not lie in too
little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of
the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution
of crime." For an even more extreme viewpoint on the part of a federal judge, see
Yankwich, Concealment or Revealment, 3 F.R.D. 209, 210-11 (1943).
59. State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424-5, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910).
60. See State v. Bunk, 63 A. 2d 842, 844 (New Jersey County Court, 1949). ("The
element of reciprocity is present in the conduct of civil causes. Each party may examine
the other, force disclosure of material evidence and thus reduce to a minimum the element
of surprise or chance in the trial. In criminal cases no such reciprocity is possible. The
State could not examine the defendant before trial without his consent, nor could any
rule of court ... force ... such examination.") ; State v. Rhoads, supra note 59. ("The
state cannot compel the prisoner at the bar to submit his private papers or memoranda to
the state for use or even examination.... Then, why should the accused be allowed to rum-
mage through the private papers of the prosecuting attorney? Neither the sublime teach-
ings of the Golden Rule to which we have been referred, nor the supposed sense of fair
play, can be so perverted as to sanction the demands allowed in this case [inspection of
grand jury minutes].").
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Fairness therefore dictates that the defendant be precluded from "fishing" into
the people's case.
61
This argument is based on several questionable assumptions. First, the asser-
tion that the accused always has the upper hand is not necessarily true. Many
defendants suffer the handicaps of low intelligence, lack of funds, and inadequate
counsel; they face an opponent with potentially unlimited resources. 2 Second,
a fair degree of reciprocity in disclosure is attainable. Defendants may be re-
quired to give notice of an alibi or insanity defense, and to reveal the names of
their witnesses. 3 Third, talk of "disadvantage" to the government assumes that
criminal trials are contests in which the state's sole interest is to win cases.
Actually, criminal procedure has two objectives-to convict the guilty and
acquit the innocent 64-- and the prosecutor, as a public official, should not pursue
one to the neglect of the other. Indeed, it has been said that the substantive law
should be designed for criminals, the procedural law for innocent persons.,;
Defendant at a Disadvantage. Unfair disadvantage may also be advanced
as an argument against requiring defendants to serve notice of special defenses
or submit to other discovery. The argument is three-fold. For one thing, the
61. See People v. Skoyec, 183 Misc. 764, 766, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 438, 440 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
62. See STEWART, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 155 (1945) : [After quot-
ing Judge Yankwich, supra note 58] "This view must be shared by the Advisory Commit-
tee [on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]. I wonder where they obtain their
information that it is one sided in favor of a defendant when everyone of experience in
the practice knows that the exact opposite is the truth. How do they account for the con-
viction of almost everyone indicted in federal courts if they believe that the government
has anything but the best of it? I don't think that the framers of our Constitution believed
that a defendant should be required to 'meet some element of surprise.' We do know,
however, that such is the present practice and no effort was made by the rule makers to
correct the evils of federal practice."
63. See page 632 supra.
64. Professor Hall suggests that the basic dilemma of criminal procedure "con-
sists in the fact that the easier it is made to prove guilt, the more difficult does it
become to establish innoncence." Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural
Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 728 (1942).
65. Id. at 730. Hall sums up his views thus: "It may be wise to place certain
restrictions on the present mode of criminal defense but it is obviously fallacious to
pretend that the necessity or wisdom results because the pendulum has swung too
far already in favor of the accused. We know that under present safeguards, innocent
persons are convicted, and the recent federal provision for compensation implies that
their number is not negligible. Anyone with actual experience in the administration
of criminal law realizes that in the vast majority of cases the handicaps of fortune
and intelligence are so great as to make 'equality' of the parties hardly more than a
humbug. The professional criminal undoubtedly has many advantages but they result
from his greater knowledge, financial and political support, as well as from deficiencies
in the substantive law .... Certainly any revision in criminal procedure constructed
with professional offenders particularly in mind, or on the supposition that 'the rogues
have too many chances of escape' because of the 18th and 19th century progress in safe-
guards, would result in a ritual whose efficiency would be equalled only by its terror."
Ibid. See, generally, BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
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prosecution, with its superior resources for investigation, scientific tests, and
legal preparation, is better able than the ordinary defendant to make use of dis-
closure.6 Furthermore, to require notice of special defenses would revive the
injustices of the old rules of pleading.'7 Failure to plead a defense might deprive
an accused of the right to offer it-a harsh consequence to ignorant defendants
whose counsel may be careless or overworked.68 Finally, compelling disclosure
by defendants is said to resemble too closely European inquisitorial methods. 69
Continental investigating magistrates can subject the accused to exhaustive
questioning.70 But Anglo-American law allows the defendant to remain silent
and challenge the prosecution to prove him guilty.71
6. For a suggestion that disclosure of alibi defenses is unjustifiable unless there
is mutual disclosure, see Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
56 YALE L.J. 197, 215-16 (1947).
67. Formerly it was easy for civil litigants to lose their rights because of slight
errors or omissions in pleading. See, e.g., Frosh v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn.
300, 199 Atl. 646 (1938); Voccia v. Pleasure Boat Co., 239 App. Div. 165, 267 N. Y.
Supp. 240 (lst Dep't 1933).
68. State v. Wallace, 170 Ore. 60, 131 P. 2d 222 (1942), illustrates how requiring
notice of special defenses may cause seeming injustice. Defendant, a swamper in a
Chinese gambling establishment, was accused of murder. His court-appointed lawyers
bad him examined by a psychiatrist, who pronounced him sane. Hence the required
notice of the defense of insanity was not given. But at the beginning of the trial, the
prosecutor, in his opening statement, revealed facts about the crime which indicated
that defendant had been insane at the time he committed the murder. The defense
attorneys, claiming that this information was new to them, asked the court for per-
mission to give notice of an insanity defense. The request was denied. Subsequently,
although the prosecution in proving its case presented considerable evidence of the
defendant's irrational behavior, the court refused to submit the issue of insanity to
the jury. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal, the conviction
was affirmed by a bare majority. The dissenting opinion stated: "[T]he writer can
come to no other conclusion than that defendant was denied the right given to him
by substantive law which entitles him to be fully heard upon the only defense he had.
The writer thinks that, especially in a capital case, procedural law should not be
permitted to prevent substantive law from being available to the defendant." 170 Ore.
136-8, 131 P. 2d 251-2.
69. See Fee, Pre-Trials in Criminal Cases, 4 F.R.D. 338 (1946).
70. See, generally, Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate (Juge D'Instruction)
In European Criminal Procedure, 33 MicH. L. REv. 1010 (1935). For a description
of the French preliminary hearing, at which the accused and other witnesses are
questioned in secret, see Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime In France,
88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 692, 705-23 (1940). American criticisms of French procedure are
discussed, and the French system partially defended, in Hogg, French Criminal Pro-
cedure, 23 CAN. B. REv. 846 (1945).
71. On the historical origins of the differences between inquisitorial methods and
Anglo-American accusatorial procedures, see Howard, Some Characteristics and
Tendencies of English Criminal Justice, 15 MiNN. L. REv. 525 (1931). The historical
development is given in Ullman, Some Medieval Principles of Criminal Procedure, 59
JUIUD. REv. 1 (1947). The Anglo-American system has been severely criticized for
unduly protecting guilty defendants. See Perkins, supra note 6; Dean, Advance Speci-
fications of Delense in Criminal Cases, 20 A.B.A.J. 435-6 (1934).
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None of these fears is entirely justified. While prosecutors have greater re-
sources at their disposal than most defendants, their advantage is partly offset
by the safeguards afforded the accused.7 2 The danger of inadvertant mistakes in
pleading can be avoided by relying instead on full examination of witnesses
before trial as the mechanism of disclosure.7 3 And discovery can hardly result
in inquisitions; the defendant, by invoking his constitutional privilege, can refuse
to answer any questions or to produce incriminating evidence.
7 4
Arguments for Discovery
Preparation for Trial. The principal argument for broader pre-trial dis-
closure is that it is necessary to help the defense prepare its caseYi Since
modem indictments are uninformative,76 surprise is quite possible. Surprise
can easily result in injustice; for cross-examination, impeachment, and rebuttal
depend for their effectiveness on careful investigation and preparation 7 These
weapons are virtually useless to an attorney faced at trial with unexpected evi-
dence from a previously unknown hostile witness.7 8 In such situations, brief
72. It is hard to reconcile the picture of the helpless defendant with the opposing
view that the accused has every advantage over the government. See page 634 supra.
Perhaps the true situation lies somewhere between these two extremes.
73. See Rule 3, page 642 infra.
74. Alil~i statutes, for example, probably do not violate the Fifth Amendment;
they do not compel the defendant to be a witness against himself or to give evidence
against himself. See Robinson, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
27 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y. 38, 45-6 (1943). On the privilege against self-incrimination, see,
generally 8 WIGMORE, EvmixcE § 2250 et seq.
75. See United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670-1 (1922).
76. Discovery is a necessary complement to a system of simple notice pleading,
in whici-the complaint (or indictment) is too brief and general to furnish an adequate
basis for trial preparation. See RAGAND, Discov- R BEFoRE TRIAL 261-3 (1932). A
function somewhat similar to discovery is performed by the bill of particulars and the
prosecutor's opening statement. That intentional failure of the prosecutor to outline
his case in the opening statement may be grounds for reversing a conviction, see Note,
5 TEmPLE L. Q. 469 (1931).
Some prosecution evidence may be disclosed at a preliminary examination before
a magistrate immediately after arrest. But this is an inadequate substitute for other
forms of disclosure. Preliminary examinations are not mandatory. And where they
are held, they may reveal only fragments of the prosecution's case. See ORF ELD, Caim-
iNA.L PRocEaDu rE o ARREST To APPEAL 279 (1947).
77. Cross-examination must be planned carefully in advance. Adverse witnesses
should be interviewed, their backgrounds investigated, and evidence likely to prove
self-contradiction or perjury collected. See BuscH, LAW AND TAcTics IN JURY TRIALs
460-6 (1949); CoRNELIUs, TRIAL TActics 248-55 (1932).
78. In Keser v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 809, 243 S.W. 1020 (1922), defendant,
accused of possessing intoxicating liquor, was surprised at the trial by the testimony
of one Boggs, who said he had seen defendant throwing whiskey out of an upstairs
Window while officers were searching the premises below. Upon conviction, defendant
appealed, claiming he could bring witnesses to contradict Boggs, but had not been
able to round them up in time to rebut the unexpected testimony. The court, holding
that-defendant had been unfairly surprised, ordered a new trial.
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continuances are of little aid, and subsequent motions for a new trial on the
ground of unfair surprise are seldom granted.79
The need for discovery is underlined by the growing intricacy of issues in
criminal trials. Such up-to-date crimes as financial fraud, conspiracy, and anti-
trust violation necessitate elaborate investigation and research before trial. 0
And today even an old-fashioned murder case may involve complicated, scien-
tific evidence. 8 ' Participation in state-conducted tests on bloodstains, finger-
prints, or ballistics, for example, may be a life-and-death matter to a defendant.
8 2
Discovery is also necessary to help the prosecution prepare for trial. If the
defendant is allowed to conceal his hand, he may surprise the prosecution with
an alibi or insanity defense.8 3 When an unexpected defense is kept secret until
near the end of the trial, the state has no time to investigate the story or the
witnesses. Criminals may escape conviction with false alibis which the state,
if forewarned, might have refuted.8 4
To the extent that lack of disclosure by either side causes unpreparedness
or surprise, it makes trials resemble the old wager of battle. The modern com-
batants are the lawyers, and their weapons are secrecy, maneuver, and sudden
revelation.85 Procedure which puts a premium on clever tactics is not the best
way to determine truth.
79. E.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 160, 227 S.W. 149 (1920); see Hagan
v. 'Commonwealth, 179 Ky. 201, 205-6, 200 S.W. 336, 337-8 (1918). But cf. State v.
Price, 100 W. Va. 699, 131 S.E. 710 (1926), reversing a conviction because the prose-
cution introduced unexpected evidence.
80. For the complex type of proof required in antitrust cases, and resultant prob-
lems, see Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE
L.J. 1019, 1242 (1949). In such cases the defendant's rights to disclosure are entirely
different depending on whether the government chooses to bring a civil or a criminal
action. If it brings a civil suit, the defendant can invoke the extensive provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; but if it brings a criminal action, the defendant
can obtain virtually no disclosure under the Criminal Rules.
81. See O'HARA & Os'murtma, AN INTRoDuc-riON To CIramNALs.IScs (1949).
82. See Note, 41 J. Cnm. L. & CamnNOLoGy 64 (1950), advocating a statute
allowing defendants to inspect the results of state-conducted tests and experiments.
83. See Esch, Ohio's New "Alibi Defense" Law, 9 PANEL 42 (1931).
84. See Dean, supra note 71, at 436; Freeman, Should the Defendant in a Criminal
Case te a Written Pleading Outlining His Defense, 8 MiNN. L. Rxv. 357 (1924);
Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 9 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y. 135, 139-40
(1925).
Alibi statutes, now fairly common, see note 47 supra, have reportedly been success-
ful in reducing the number of acquittals on alibi defenses. See Esch, supra note 83;
Toy, Michigan Law on Alibi and Insanity Defenses Reduces Perjury, 9 PANEL 52
(1931). The Scottish affirmative defense law, note 47 supra, is also reported to have
improved the administration of justice. See Note, English and Scottish Criminal Pro-
cedure-Some Comparisons, 102 JusT. P. 644, 645 (1938).
85. See Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42 Msic. L.
R-v. 353, 366 (1943): "Criminal trials should not be regarded as sporting games in
which the adversaries have secret plays which they may properly conceal until some
dramatic moment. Entertainment for participants or spectators is not the goal of a
criminal trial."
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Preservation of Testimony. Discovery is more than an aid to trial prepara-
tion. When linked to a deposition procedure, it is useful in preserving accurate
testimony.86 If witnesses are interviewed before trial, and their statements
turned into depositions, their knowledge can be recorded while their recollec-
tions are fresh and presumably most correct.8 7 Trials may be long postponed,
and inaccurate or false testimony is likely when the witness, having forgotten
his actual observations, must "revive" them ith the aid or connivance of one of
the parties. 88 But once a witness' testimony is down on paper, his story is
harder to change: depositions can always be used to impeach perjurers and
refresh the recollection of the forgetful.89
Summary
The main argument for discovery is that it may aid in getting at truth and
in reducing the combat element in trials. Opposition to discovery, on the other
hand, is largely based on the belief that it will make falsification of evidence
easy. But since the opportunity for perjury exists anyway, and since disclosure
is designed to combat perjury affirmatively by aiding in its exposure, the prob-
able advantages of disclosure outweigh its potential abuses. Discovery pro-
cedures for criminal trials should therefore be expanded.
86. See RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFORE TRuL 11-24, 124-5, 241-6 (1932).
87. This procedure is a vital element of discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the federal deposition procedure in practice, see Comment, 59 YALE L.J.
117 (1949).
In federal criminal proceedings, depositions may be taken only under the circum-
stances set forth in Rule 15 (a), FED. R. Cam,. P.: "If it appears that a prospective
witness may be unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that
his testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to
prevent a failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of an indictment or
information may upon motion of a defendant and notice to the parties order that his
testimony be taken by deposition and that any designated books, papers, documents
or tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place."
88. See Alexander, Uproot Perjury by Prompt Examination of Witnesses, 7
PANEL no. 1 p. 2 (1929); Note, To Combat Perjury and Reduce Legal Delays, id. at 4.
89. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide as follows for the use of
depositions at trial: "At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition,
so far as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if it appears:
That the witness is dead; or that the witness is out of the United States, unless it
appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposi-
tion; or that the witness is unable to attend because of sickness or infirmity; or that
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena. Any deposition may also be used by any party for the purpose
of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness. If only a
part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require
him to offer all of it which is relevant to the part offered and any party may offer
other parts." FED. R. CRni. P. 15 (e).
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In exploring the possibilities for further disclosure, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure serve as a useful guide.90 Of the various devices provided in
the Civil Rules, at least four-inspection of evidence, physical and mental ex-
aminations, examination of witnesses before trial, and pre-trial conferences-
are in varying degrees adaptable to criminal procedure. The following rules
are proposed as a skeleton draft of a criminal disclosure statute.'
PROPOSED RULES
Rule 1: Inspection of Tangible Evidence
At least twenty days before trial, or earlier if the court so orders, each party
shall produce at a time and place designated by the court all documents, papers
or things which the party intends to introduce in evidence. Thereupon any
party shall, in the presence of a person designated by the court, be permitted
to inspect or copy any such documents, papers or things.92 If the evidence re-
lates to scientific tests or experiments, the opposing party shall also be permitted
to be present during the tests and to inspect the results thereof. The court shall
exclude any evidence not presented for inspection or copying pursuant to this
Rule, unless good cause is shown for failure to comply.93 In the latter case the
opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance during which it may inspect or
copy the evidence in the manner provided above.
Comment. This Rule extends radically both the prosecution's and the
defendant's opportunities for getting disclosure, by compelling reciprocal pro-
duction of all tangible evidence before trial.
Since this Rule is limited to the production of evidence which will be offered
at the trial, it cannot be criticized for permitting "fishing expeditions" into the
opposition's case. For the same reason, it does not violate the defendant's pri-
vilege against self-incrimination. He need reveal only what he intends to pro-
duce anyway in his own defense.
The Rule goes beyond the Florida statute by giving defendants an absolute
right to participate in scientific tests and experiments.94 It does the same for
the right to inspect confessions and incriminating letters, omitted from Fed-
eral Rule 16, but included in Maryland,95 since such documents will normally
be offered in evidence by the prosecution.
90. At least one federal district judge has suggested that the spirit of the Civil
Discovery Rules be carried over into criminal procedure. Freed, The Rides of Criminal
Procedure: An Appraisal Based on a Year's Experience, 33 A.B.A.J. 1010, 1012 (1947).
91. No attempt has been made to include all of the details that would be necessary
in a carefully drafted statute. Instead, references are given to comparable provisions
of the Federal Civil Rules, the details of which should in most instances be suitable
for criminal procedure.
92. See FEn. R. Civ. P. 34.
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (ii).
94. See note 19 supra.
95 See note 29 supra.
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Rule 2: Inspection of Books, Papers, and Objects by Defendant
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of an indictment or
information, the court may, upon a showing of good cause, order the prosecution
to produce for inspection or copying by the defendant designated books, docu-
ments, papers or things:
(a) Taken from the defendant by the prosecution;
(b) Taken from others by seizure or process; or
(c) Necessary to the preparation of the defendant's case;
regardless of whether the prosecution intends to introduce in evidence such
books, documents, papers or things, and regardless of whether they are ad-
missible in evidence.
Comment. This Rule covers disclosure of certain objects in the prosecutor's
possession which he may not even introduce in evidence. The purpose of
(a) and (b) is to make available objects which the defendant would or-
dinarily have been able to inspect had it not been for government seizure.90
These subsections incorporate the substance of Federal Rule 16.97 Material
not included in (a) and (b), but nevertheless necessary to trial preparation,
is available in the court's discretion under (c).9s
Rule 2 is restricted to prosecution disclosure to obviate constitutional ob-
jections under the privilege against self-incrimination. 9 The Rule includes
checks not present in Rule 1. To police unreasonable and harassing requests,
96. See FED. R. CRIm. P., Committee note to Rule 16. See also Medalie, Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 LAw. GUILD Rxv. no. 3, p. 1, 8 (1944): "The United
States Attorney, in a zealous effort to procure all available evidence, not infrequently re-
moves practically every book and paper in the possession of the defendant or his Company
via Grand Jury subpoena. If the defendant has not taken the trouble to photostat every
book or record, he is frequently helpless in preparing his defense, without an inspection
of his books and records."
97. FED. R. Citm. P. 16. See text, note 21 su1pra.
98. One problem likely to arise under subsection (c) is that the prosecution will
refuse to produce documents on the ground of special privilege. Federal officers are
forbidden by statute to produce certain documents. Department of Justice Order No.
3229, -filed May 2, 1946, issued pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946). They have been upheld
in refusing to obey subpoenas duces tecum. U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 71 S. Ct. 416
(951). The same problem has already arisen under the Federal Civil Rules. See
Berger & Krash, Government Immunity From Discovery, 59 YALE L. J. 1451 (1950).
99. The privilege protects an individual from any incriminating disclosure sought
by legal process against him as a witness. This includes the production of documents or
other tangible evidence in response to a court order or subpoena. Hence it is unlikely
that a statute allowing the state to require the defendant to produce things which he
does not intend to introduce in evidence would be upheld against constitutional attack.
8 WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE §§ 2263-4 (3d ed. 1940).
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it subjects disclosure to the court's discretion. 0 0 And by requiring the de-
fendant to move for disclosure it forces him to designate the objects he wishes
to see.' 01 The designation requirement should involve little hardship: the de-
fendant will usually know about items covered by (a) and (b), and he can
get helpful leads to objects he may wish to inspect under (c) by questioning
witnesses under Rule 3.
Ride 3: Examination of Witnesses
Upon the filing of an indictment or information the prosecution shall serve
the defendant with a list of the names and addresses of witnesses whom the
prosecution intends to call at the trial. 02 Within fifteen days thereafter (or
longer, by leave of the court)' 03 the defendant may give notice of intention to
examine any of these witnesses, or any other persons having knowledge
material to the case.1 4 The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by sub-
poena, 105 and the court may permit the defendant to examine an individual who
is in prison.'0
Examinations may consist of written interrogatories to be answered under
oath, 107 or oral questioning under oath with a written deposition to be made
of the testimony. 08 Witnesses may be examined as to any matter, not privi-
leged, relating to the case, including the nature and whereabouts of documents
and tangible evidence, or the identity and whereabouts of other witnesses, re-
gardless of whether the testimony would be admissible in evidence. If the
examination is oral, the prosecutor may be present and ask questions of the
witness.
Thirty days after the last of the above examinations, but, except by leave
of the court, no later than ninety days after the defense receives the govern-
100. The discretionary power of the trial court, as provided in FED. R. CRIM. P. 16,
is criticized in Stewart, op. cit. supra note 62, at 154: "[T]he rule makes the trial judge
a court of last resort. If the trial judge refuses to allow inspection, a defendant must wait
until he is convicted and then convince the Circuit Court that he complied with all the
conditions, and that the Court was wrong in holding that his request was not reasonable.
The Circuit Court will say, in effect, that in view of the fact that he was guilty, no
amount of preparation could or should have changed the result, so therefore the judg-
ment will be affirmed."
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 contains a similar requirement.
102. Compare the witness list statutes, note 41 supra.
103. In some cases it may take more than fifteen days for a defendant to secure an
attorney.
104. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26.
105. See id. 45(d).
106. Occasionally it may be important for a defendant to get the testimony of a con-
federate in prison. Whether this right should be afforded in a given case is left to the
court's discretion, because of the difficulty of bringing individuals from prison to testify.
107. See id. 31.
108. See id. 30, 28.
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ment's list of witnesses, 109 and no later than five days before commencement
of trial, the defendant shall serve the prosecutor with a list of the names and
addresses of witnesses whom the defendant intends to call at the trial. There-
after the government may conduct examinations in the manner provided above.
Any person may be examined, whether or not listed by the defense. Both
defense counsel and counsel for the witness may be present and may ask ques-
tions, if the examination is oral.
The court shall have power to compel witnesses to answer questions as to
any matter not privileged, and relevant to the issues of the case.110 No witness
may be examined a second time except by leave of the court. The court may
limit examinations to prevent harassment, and may prohibit oral examination
if it finds the witness is in danger of undue coercion by the opposing side. If
the defendant is impecunious, the government shall pay the costs of all
examinations.:"'
Depositions may be used at trial, to the extent permitted by the rules of
evidence, (a) to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and (b) to impeach.
112
If a party, after serving its list of witnesses, decides to call an additional wit-
ness, it shall immediately notify all other parties that it is supplementing its
list of witnesses. Thereupon such witnesses may be examined in the manner
provided above.
No witness shall testify at the trial unless he is previously listed by the
party calling him, or unless the court finds that the party did not previously
know the witness' whereabouts or the materiality of his testimony."13 If an
unlisted witness is allowed to testify, the opposing party shall be entitled to a
continuance during which it may examine the witness out of court in the
manner provided above.
Comment. This Rule provides rights previously unknown to criminal pro-
cedure in the United States. It enables the defendant for the first time to dis-
cover all that the prosecution's witnesses will say. Inspection of grand jury
minutes, where available, gives access only to a portion of this testimony. Wit-
ness list statutes give even less, since the defendant, while he can interview
listed witnesses, cannot compel them to "talk." At the same time, this Rule
enables the prosecution to get warning of possible surprise defenses like alibi
and insanity. Even under state alibi statutes, disclosure of the names of defense
109. Without this provision, a defendant with substantial funds could use deposition
machinery to postpone the trial unduly. In civil cases this power is sometimes used to
force the opponent into a compromise. See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 131-4 (1949).
110. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
111. The problem of expenses may be a serious one if many depositions are involved.
See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 126-31 (1949).
112. Generally depositions may be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted only
if the witness is "unavailable." Definitions of unavailability vary, and it might be desirable
to adopt the liberal provisions of FED. M. CIrv. P. 26(d) in this respect.
113. Compare the witness list statutes, note 41 supra.
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witnesses is seldom required.1 14 Alibi statutes, moreover, are really rules of
pleading, likely to work a hardship on defendants who inadvertently fail to give
notice of their affirmative defenses. The present Rule involves no such problem.
There are no restrictions on a witness' testimony at the trial. He may, however,
be impeached if he contradicts his deposition.
This Rule would help to place the parties on an equal footing in their op-
portunity to prepare for trial. Under present law the prosecution can ques-
tion any potential witness under oath by calling him before a grand jury.1 15
If the testimony is unfavorable, the witness need not be called. The defendant,
on the other hand, has no way of compelling possible defense witnesses to
answer questions before trial; he may have to risk calling them at the trial in
the hope that their testimony will help him. In addition, the rule goes far
toward preventing intimidation of prospective witnesses. Where the defense,
or even the prosecution-when proceeding without a grand jury--questions
witnesses extrajudicially, intimidation of witnesses is far more likely than
when they are interviewed in the presence of counsel for both sides.
The main difference between this Rule and the comparable Civil Rule lies in
the time gap between prosecution and defense disclosure. 116 Presumably the
state will have assembled its witnesses by the time it obtains an indictment.
But the defendant will often need time to recruit rebuttal witnesses. If com-
pelled to disclose his witnesses upon the filing of the indictment, he may be
unable to comply, with the result that the state would be entitled to repeated
continuances as defense witnesses are brought on at the trial.
The Rule is subject to a few limitations. First, witnesses may be compelled
to answer only relevant questions; otherwise examinations might stray too far,
causing delay, inconvenience, and perhaps personal embarrassment. Second,
the defendant may not be examined, because of his privilege against becoming
a witness. Finally, the court is given general supervision over the whole pro-
cedure to prevent abuses.11t
Rule 4: Physical and Mental Examinations
In any case where the physical or mental condition of an individual is in
issue, either party may ask the court for an order permitting a physician or
psychiatrist to conduct an examination of such individual."18 The court shall
114. See notes 47 and 48 supra.
115. See Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YAIE L.J.
687 (1932).
116. No time gap exists in the Civil Rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
117. See id. 30(b) and 30(d).
118. A number of states have statutes permitting or requiring the court to order the
mental examination of defendants who plead the defense of insanity. E.g., CoLo. STAT.
ANN. c. 48 § 508 (1935) (where defendant pleads insanity, court must commit him to
a state mental hospital for observation; court may also appoint physicians to examine
defendant, and they may be called as witnesses by the court or by either party) ; Orio
GEN. CODE § 13441-4 (Page 1937) (where insanity is set up as a defense, court has power
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grant the order if good cause is shown, and may prescribe the conditions under
which the examination shall take place." 9
Comment. This Rule provides a new type of discovery which may be of
crucial importance where the physical condition of a prosecution witness is in
issue. It may also enable the defense to discover a witness' mental disorder
which may throw serious doubt on his capacity to tell the truth. 2 0 Rape prose-
cutions illustrate both functions of the rule. Physical tests may disclose that
the prosecutrix was in fact never raped, while psychiatric examination may
divulge a mental disorder and provide a basis for an attack on her credibility.' 2 '
Witnesses are protected from unwarranted examination by court supervision.
Rule 5: Pre-Trial Conferences
At the suggestion of either party, or on his own initiative, the trial judge
may invite the prosecuting and defense attorneys to a pre-trial conference. 22
This conference shall take place preferably after each side has completed its
examination of opposing witnesses under Rule 3.123 At the conference the
judge may seek to obtain agreement on the simplification of issues and proof,
limitation of the number of expert witnesses, or other matters which will pro-
mote a fair and expeditious trial. The judge may embody the results of agree-
ments in an order which shall be binding on the parties at the trial. Neither
the judge nor the prosecutor shall at such conference seek or obtain any
admissions of guilt from the defendant or a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
to commit the defendant to a mental hospital for observation and may appoint physicians
to examine him; these physicians may be called as witnesses by the court). See ,Veihofen,
Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 M cH. L. REV. 961,
965-74 (1950).
It has been generally held that to compel a defendant who pleads insanity to submit
to a mental examination does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Ingles
v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. 2d 1109 (1933) ; Noelke v. State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E. 2d
950 (1938) ; Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930). In People v. Esposito,
287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E. 2d 925 (1942), use of drugs to facilitate a compulsory psychiatric
examination was held not to violate the privilege, but the court did not pass upon the
question whether the psychiatrists could have testified to admissions of guilt that might
possibly have been made by the defendant while drugged.
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
120. See Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59
YALE L.J. 1324 (1950).
121. See, e.g., State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921). And see 3
WkGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 924a, 934a (3d ed. 1940).
122. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
123. "The testimony of [federal] district judges is overwhelming that the best time
for [civil] pre-trial is shortly before trial and this means not less than one week and not
more than three as an objective to be attained where possible. The reason for this is
that by that time the deadline is close enough so that the parties come into pre-trial
knowing what they are going to prove, what the issues are, what documents are to be
introduced ... " Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal Judges, 4 F.R.D. 183, 185
(1946).
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No incriminating admissions made by the defense at the conference shall bind
the defendant at trial or be admissible in evidence. Pre-trial conferences shall
not be held unless the defendant is represented by counsel.
1 24
Comment. Pre-trial conferences make possible the simplification of complex
cases through the use of knowledge gained by disclosure. 25 Experimentation
with such conferences in antitrust prosecutions and other involved criminal
cases suggests that pre-trial may prove valuable in the criminal field if co-
ordinated with disclosure procedures. 1 26 The function of pre-trial is, however,
more limited in criminal than in civil cases. Aside from simplifying issues, an
additional purpose of civil pre-trial is to encourage compromise. But in a
criminal case, where the public interest is at stake, compromise is not an appro-
priate aim of judicial processes. For this reason, the Rule forbids the judge or
prosecutor to obtain from the defendant admissions of guilt or pleas of guilty
to lesser offenses.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing Rules should be a long-range objective of American criminal
procedure. The disappearance of private prosecution and the new attitude
toward criminals as products rather than enemies of society make increasingly
inappropriate a combat-type trial. And the accurate fact-finding which the
Rules would promote is even more vital in criminal than in civil cases. In-
justices resulting from mistakes of fact are not only tragedies to the persons
accused; they may undermine confidence in government itself. Therefore im-
position of criminal sanctions should be based on procedures best designed to
find facts accurately. Elimination of secrecy and surprise from criminal trials
would be a significant step in this direction.
124. See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT
78 (1944).
125. For an attack on the use of pre-trial in criminal cases, see Fee, supra note 69,
at 340-1. On the successful use of pre-trial in civil cases, see NIMs, PRE-TRIAL (1950).
The use of pre-trial in civil antitrust cases is discussed in detail in McAllister, The Big
Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1950).
126. See Way, New Technique Facilitates Crimtzal Trials, 25 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y. 120
(1941). The tentative drafts of the Federal Criminal Rules included a pre-trial provision,
but it was rejected by the Supreme Court on objections from government and defense
lawyers. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 YALE L.J. 197,
215 (1947).
On the possible dangers of pre-trial, see Fee, supra note 69, at 342-7; Shafroth, supra
note 123.
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